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ARTICLE 9 WORKS-HOW COME?
Howard Ruda*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990 the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code' (PEB) established a study committee to consider
whether Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should be
revised, and if so to recommend the nature and substance of the revi-
sions. At the end of 1992 the committee issued its report,2 concluding
that some revisions would be desirable. The recommended revisions,
however, are generally in the nature of the incremental changes that
one would expect the passage of time to require.3 The committee
concluded that "Article 9 is fundamentally and conceptually sound,"4
and the proposed revisions do not alter the Article's structure or
principles.
The study committee's judgment that Article 9 is fundamentally
sound is widely shared by experienced lawyers.5 "Article 9 generally
has provided a sound set of rules governing attachment, perfection,
priority, and enforcement of security interests in personal property."6
More than thirty years of personal experience with the application of
Article 9 to commercial transactions leads me to concur in this view.
This article considers how Article 9 "works" when applied to
commercial transactions. While Article 9 also applies to consumer
transactions, a wide array of federal and state consumer protection
* Counsel, Hahn & Hessen, New York, New York.
1. The PEB functions under authority of the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the two organizations that
promulgated the UCC.
2. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB Study Group,
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Report (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Study Group Re-
port]. Copies of the report are available from: Order Department, The American Law
Institute, 4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099.
3. Fifty years have passed since Article 9 was first enacted, and over 20 years since it
was last revised.
4. Study Group Report, supra note 2, at 6 ("General Recommendation of the
Committee").
5. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld, But the Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Was
Adopted, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 597, 605-06 (1993) ("Article 9 is generally perceived as a
legislative triumph.").
6. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee ReporL
Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 561, 569 (1992-1993).
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laws override its provisions.7 Any analysis of how Article 9 operates
in a consumer context largely turns on the efficacy of these consumer
laws. Therefore, I am only considering the Article's operational quali-
ties in relation to business credit transactions."
I am not addressing the extensive academic literature discussing
whether secured financing is economically efficient. 9 However, I be-
lieve it is efficient insofar as it enables persons to receive funding upon
terms that would not be available to them but for the grant of security.
The long-standing, widespread use of secured credit throughout the
United States, as well as in other economically developed nations,
suggests that my view is widely shared. In any event, whatever the
merits of secured financing, Article 9's purpose is to provide an effi-
cient set of rules to facilitate utilization of personal property for such
financing.
I believe Article 9 accomplishes its purpose, in that:
1. It enables credit seekers to receive the maximum amount
of credit rationally justifiable, upon the most favorable terms
economically available;
2. It enables credit grantors to meet the needs of credit
seekers, that is, the credit grantors' customers, while provid-
ing credit grantors maximum certainty that they will have the
first priority security interest upon which they are relying;
3. Transactional costs, whether in money, time, stress, or
uncertainty, are kept to a minimum;
4. There is minimal cost, uncertainty, or risk to third parties
in the conduct of their relationship with the credit seekers;10
and
5. No class of persons is systemically exposed to "unjust,"
but unavoidable, consequences.11
Article 9's unduly complex filing system may be viewed as the excep-
tion that proves the rule.
7. Federal law preempts state law, and UCC § 9-203(4) provides that provisions of
state regulatory statutes covering the field of consumer finance prevail over the provisions
of Article 9 in case of conflict. See U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 6 (1990).
8. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was promulgated to provide a consumer
credit balance to the UCC. It has been enacted in less than a dozen states, often in
nonuniform versions.
9. In evaluating the utility of security there is no reason to distinguish Article 9 secur-
ity interests from security interests generally.
10. I am not addressing the economic benefits and detriments to third parties resulting
from secured financing, although I believe there is a strong net benefit.
11. Individual persons may experience "unjust" outcomes, as where an innocent and
understandable perfection error results in a complete loss of perfected status.
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Having stated, in conclusory terms, that Article 9 serves an eco-
nomically useful purpose, and that it does so efficiently, I turn to con-
sidering how it achieves that efficiency. Since the Article can only be
evaluated in relation to the transactions to which it applies, my ap-
proach is transactional. I focus on those operative principles that
largely account for why Article 9 "works." Implicit in the "why" is my
conclusion that the Article does, in fact, work. If one differs with that
conclusion, then my observations can be read as describing how the
Article works.
II. ARTICLE 9's Ir mrRNAL DEFICIENCIES
Article 9's effectiveness does not derive from internal strengths.
For example, its definition of key terms, such as "collateral,"
"debtor," and "secured party,"'1 2 as including the sale of accounts and
chattel paper, results in the terms having meanings inconsistent with
ordinary usage. The default rules (Part 5 of Article 9), although defi-
nitionally applicable to sales of certain receivables, make no sense
when so applied.'3 Important terms are not defined, and their mean-
ings may change from one section to another.'
4
There is no internal logic to explain Article 9's rules. These rules
often turn on the characterization of the collateral, the debtor, or the
credit transaction. These are fact-driven determinations. Are the
goods equipment or inventory?'" Is the debtor engaged in a farming
operation?' 6 Does the transaction constitute purchase money financ-
ing?'T More than one characterization may apply. Error is possible,
and the consequences of error, such as loss of perfected status, are
potentially catastrophic to the creditor.
12. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c), (d), (m) (1990).
13. Part 5 of Article 9 largely deals with postdefault remedies that are inherently inap-
posite to a sale. However, sales are definitionally encompassed within Part 5. The same
definitional inapplicability arises elsewhere in Article 9, for example, at § 9-207.
14. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-318(3), where assignment encompasses both sales and security
interests, and § 9-318(4), where assignment is referenced separately from security interest.
For a thoughtful discussion of Article 9's definitional inadequacies see Thomas E. Plank,
Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper Under the U.C.C.
and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REv. 397
(1994).
15. U.C.C. § 9-109(2), (4).
16. Id. § 9-109(3).
17. Id& § 9-107.
November 1994]
312 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The UCC Official Comments go a long way towards remedying
the internal deficiencies of Article 9.18 Indeed, their existence con-
tributes significantly to the Article's functional utility. They often
provide a clarification that no amount of statutory drafting could ac-
complish. This clarification is effected by such mechanisms as provid-
ing an example,19 a description of transactional practice,20 case-law
precedent,21 or legislative history.22 However, if "clarity, uniformity,
and elegance ... in commercial law"' is the goal, Article 9 fails the
test. It is not internally uniform and its structure and phrasing are
neither clear nor elegant. And yet, experience shows that the Article
works. Article 9 succeeds because it is well attuned to the commercial
logic of the transactions to which it applies. It succeeds for reasons
largely extrinsic to its internal qualities.
III. ARTICLE 9 TAKES AccouNT OF ALL AFFECTED PERSONS
There are at least two consensual parties to an Article 9 transac-
tion, the debtor24 and the credit-granting secured party.' In some
measure, other persons, such as sureties for the debtor, may be parties
to the transaction. As between the creditor and the debtor, their se-
curity agreement is a wholly private contract, as is true of agreements
between the creditor and other persons, such as sureties. Article 9,
with only minor exceptions, 26 allows the consensual parties full free-
dom of contract. "This primacy given by the UCC to the agreement
between the parties (and therefore inferentially to usages of trade)
allows the UCC to adapt easily to new marketplace practices." 27 Arti-
cle 9 provides the contracting parties with gap-filling or default rules
that govern in the absence of contrary terms. Its goal is to facilitate
and support the transaction, not to regulate it.
18. The PEB Commentaries, a recent innovation, are another helpful source of gui-
dance, particularly as they respond to newly arising "glitches."
19. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4 (1990).
20. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 2.
21. 1d § 9-205 cmts. 1-4.
22. ld. § 9-302 cmt. 5.
23. Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who is Saving
the UCC?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 563, 568 (1993).
24. The debtor may be comprised of more than one person.
25. The creditor may be comprised of more than one person, who may have the same,
or more often different, priority status.
26. The exceptions are appropriate and are not unduly burdensome; for example, noti-
fication of collateral disposition by the secured party. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990).
27. Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolving Uniform Commercial Code: From Infancy to
Maturity to Old Age, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 691, 699-700 (1993).
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One reason Article 9 advances this goal is that it permits the par-
ties to do the deal that they are led to by their economic bargaining.
If, instead, the Article intruded on the parties' bargain, the results
would often be unsatisfactory. Since Article 9 covers an infinite range
of transactions, involving all types of persons, no statute could sensi-
bly regulate how these private dealings should be done, nor is there
any reason to impose such regulation in a commercial context.
Apart from the contracting parties, all security agreements may
be viewed as including an indeterminate group of nonsignatory third
parties, that is, each creditor of the debtor, including its potential
trustee in bankruptcy. The debtor's grant of a security interest to the
creditor impacts these persons, but they have not assented to the cred-
itor's priority interest in the collateral. The creditor's priority derives
entirely from statute. Therefore, as to the debtor's creditor body, Ar-
ticle 9 fills a central, not merely gap-filling, role.
In the commercial world, if a debtor can pay, it does so. If the
debtor is financially capable of paying, yet fails to do so, the creditor
can enforce its claim against the debtor or any of the debtor's assets.
Therefore, to the debtor and creditor, their contract and the general
law of creditors' rights is of more importance than Article 9. The real
efficacy of the Article is tested by the enforceability of the rights and
priorities of the secured creditor as against the debtor's other credi-
tors. In practice, this test takes place when the debtor is unable to pay
its debts generally. The acid test occurs in the debtor's bankruptcy,
where the creditor's secured position is subject to an overriding fed-
eral law that is more oriented towards equality of distribution and
debtor rehabilitation than to preservation of security interests.
Article 9 has been crafted with a regard to conflicting creditors'
rights law, including the Bankruptcy Code.2 The transaction between
the parties is primarily preserved by validating freedom of contract.
The priority of the secured creditor over other creditors is substan-
tially preserved, even in a bankruptcy setting,2 9 by an unexpressed but
nonetheless present integration of Article 9 with bankruptcy law and
policies. The Article provides for basic creditors' rights principles,
such as an abhorrence of secret liens. Consequently, the Article satis-
fies both the private agreements between the parties and the require-
ments of the creditor community at large.
28. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
29. The Bankruptcy Code does override some.of the secured party's contract rights, as
by the automatic stay, but the creditor's priority is preserved. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
November 1994]
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IV. TRANSACTIONAL LOGIC OF ARTICLE 9
Much of Article 9's effectiveness derives from the fact that its
rules follow the transactional realities that exist independently of the
Article. Unavoidably, this means that the logic of the rules is to be
found in the transactions, and not within Article 9 itself. Someone
unfamiliar with secured transactions has difficulty understanding the
"how and why" of the Article. A transactional lawyer, however, finds
the Article's rules understandable and predictable. Three examples of
this proposition follow.
A. Purchase Money Priority Notice Requirements
Article 9 permits floating liens, thereby providing a simple mech-
anism for collateral and debt to revolve.30 The priority of the floating
lienor, however, could frustrate the debtor's ability to get the
purchase money financing that is often available for purchasing inven-
tory or equipment. Article 9 pragmatically resolves this uneconomic
circumstance by providing a "super-priority" to purchase money liens
that primes the floating lienor. The preconditions for such priming
differ as between equipment and inventory. The explanation for the
difference is found in the transactions themselves.
As to equipment, the purchase money claimant need only perfect
within a prescribed time period.3 Since equipment loans are not
made in reliance on equipment to be acquired at unknown, and un-
knowable, future times, no notice to the equipment floating lienor is
required.
In contrast, the rule permitting purchase money priority over a
floating inventory lien requires prior notice.32 Since inventory lending
often contemplates that the inventory collateral will revolve, with new
inventory automatically substituted for old, the purchase money
claimant is required to give prior notice to the inventory lender of its
purchase money interest. Having received such notice, the inventory
lender can protect its interest by excluding the purchase money inven-
tory from the borrowing base.
This example illustrates Article 9's orientation to protecting the
reliance creditor. The equipment financer does not rely on future ac-
quired equipment. The inventory financer does rely on future ac-
30. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1990).
31. Id. § 9-312(4).
32. Id. § 9-312(3).
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quired inventory. Accordingly, notice of the purchase money interest
must be given to the latter, but- not the former.
B. Accounts and Chattel Paper Perfection Differences
Filing achieves perfection against accounts and chattel paper.33
However, perfection against chattel paper can also be effected by tak-
ing possession of the paper, and such perfection may prime an earlier
interest perfected solely by filing.34 The possession alternative reflects
the fact that financers of chattel paper tend to do so in reliance on
specific identifiable items of paper. Moreover, financers of inventory
do not automatically finance the chattel paper arising from the inven-
tory. In contrast, accounts receivable financers tend to finance the
accounts as a pool, with new accounts replacing the paid accounts, and
with any inventory loan often rolling into an accounts receivable loan.
Therefore, it is both desirable and practical to provide for chattel pa-
per being financed independently of a prior interest. Conversely, it is
not economically desirable or practical for accounts to be open to fi-
nancing by a multiplicity of lenders.
This example illustrates Article 9's adaptation to the operational
realities of the transactions. The potential for possession of chattel
paper priming a perfected filing certainly adds transactional cost, as
compared to the exclusive filing regime applicable to accounts. This
cost, however, is well justified by the value of facilitating chattel paper
financing alternatives, alternatives that would not be operationally
practical with respect to accounts.
Since financers of accounts and chattel paper are virtually always
professional credit grantors, they can be expected to know the rules
and function within them. Even an "amateur" receivables financer
can be expected to consult with counsel, since structuring, docu-
menting, and implementing accounts or chattel paper financing is in-
herently complex. In contrast, Article 9 is more solicitous of the
equipment financer, recognizing that equipment financing often takes
the form of vendor installment sales credit. Vendors are not necessar-
ily financing sophisticates. Their transactions are simple, one-time
credit extensions that can be documented with standardized forms.
These transactions are often consummated quickly to meet the needs
of buyer and seller, and counsel is generally not consulted, nor need it
be.
33. Id. §§ 9-302(1), 9-304(1).
34. Id. § 9-308.
November 1994]
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C. Purchaser vs. Secured Party
Inventory is intended to be sold. Buyers of inventory must be
able to rely upon their sellers' ability to deliver goods free of conflict-
ing interests. Accordingly, section 9-307(1) provides that a "buyer in
ordinary course of business"' 35 takes free of a security interest created
by its seller even though the security interest is perfected and the
buyer knows of its existence. Inventory lenders know that they are
exposed to having their inventory collateral removed from their secur-
ity interest and therefore protect themselves by such monitoring as
they deem necessary with respect to the particular debtor. In the ordi-
nary course they look to the proceeds of the sold inventory as substi-
tute collateral and their ultimate source of payment. 6
Equipment, unlike inventory, is held for use, not sale. A pur-
chaser from an equipment user has no reason to assume that the
equipment can be sold free of a security interest. Conversely, an
equipment lender has no reason to assume that the equipment will be
sold. Compelling the equipment financer to police equipment collat-
eral would impose transactional costs out of proportion to any com-
mercial need. Similarly, the equipment financer does not contemplate
monitoring, much less financing, the proceeds of equipment sales. Ac-
cordingly, a security interest in equipment continues notwithstanding
its sale or other disposition unless the secured party has authorized
such disposition.
37
This example illustrates Article 9's accommodation to the needs
of third parties, such as inventory purchasers. As between bona fide
purchaser and inventory financer, the Article allocates the risk to the
latter as the person better able to deal with it. As between equipment
financer and purchaser, the Article reverses the risk allocation.
Certainly, the rules do not well apply to all fact patterns. How-
ever, they are atypical patterns. One of Article 9's strengths is that it
effectively deals with the generality of transactions. Its rules are intui-
tively what one would expect, once transactional realities are recog-
nized. It places burdens on the party who, as a commercial matter,
can best bear the burden at the lowest transactional cost.
35. Id. § 1-201(9).
36. Proceeds of inventory are both the ultimate payments by the account debtors and
the purchase price or advance of a third party assignee of the receivables. I do not here
address the extent to which an inventory financer, having received the latter, can also claim
priority in the former.
37. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
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V. PROBLEM SOLVING, AND ITS LIMITS
Because of its transactional orientation the application of Article
9 to specific credit extensions is not always clear. For example, com-
pliance with such fundamentals as perfection depends upon proper
characterization, but in a particular fact setting characterization is not
always free of doubt. Key definitions may have counter-intuitive
meanings. The Article, even when read with the official comments,
may not provide guidance.
Article 9's solution to many potential problems is to permit a
"belt and suspenders" approach. For example, filings can be made,
with minimal cost, in every likely jurisdiction. Similarly, perfection
can be accomplished in concurrent alternative modes by filing and
taking possession. If unsure whether a security interest should be per-
fected under or outside of Article 9, the creditor can always resolve
the Article 9 component by perfecting under Article 9.38 Similarly, if
unsure whether equipment constitutes a fixture, the ready answer is to
file both fixture and nonfixture filings.39
This is not to say that potential for error does not exist. Professor
James White has identified over 300 reported bankruptcy cases involv-
ing Article 9 perfection issues from the beginning of 1980 through the
end of 1990.40 However, my reading of perfection cases indicates that
the secured party could have avoided loss, or even litigation, if it had
correctly searched and timely filed proper financing statements, all in
the correct places. In almost all cases, the secured party could easily
have done so, resolving uncertainties by perfecting in alternative ways
and places. A reasonably careful lawyer, taking advantage of Article
9's potential for achieving certainty by "precautionary" and "redun-
dant" perfection, can practice for years without a perfection challenge,
much less a loss.
Potential for fraud is inherent to personal property financing. For
example, the debtor can sell inventory for cash, and retain the pro-
ceeds. The debtor can claim to have more inventory than it in fact
has, or that its inventory is marketable when it is not. Similarly, the
debtor can divert receivables collections, create fictitious paper, sell
on consignment or bill-and-hold terms, pre-bill, secrete equipment, or
misrepresent its ownership status.
38. See id. §§ 9-302(3)-(4).
39. See id. U.C.C. § 9-313.
40. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 823, 830-41 (1993).
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Creditors understand that they ought not to knowingly extend
credit to a morally defective debtor.41 Their protection against un-
knowingly doing so is by policing, monitoring, and auditing the
debtor, the collateral, and contractual compliance.
Article 9 deters some potential frauds, such as double financing.
However, unlike the motor vehicle title acts, fraud prevention is an
incidental, rather than primary, purpose. This limitation upon Article
9's utility is responsive to the impracticality of designing a statute that
will effectively deter most types of misconduct or fraud. Any attempt
to do so would produce a cumbersome set of rules that would frus-
trate some transactions, materially burden all of them, and still fail to
accomplish its goal. This is not a case where something is better than
nothing. Barring only one window of my home is no better than bar-
ring none.
The foregoing illustrates that one element of how Article 9 works
is that it does not undertake more than it can efficiently achieve.
VI. SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
The application of Article 9 turns on the substance, rather than
the form, of the transaction.42 Thus, the sale of accounts and chattel
paper are brought within the ambit of the Article. This provides cer-
tainty to the record searcher. Of no less importance, it provides cer-
tainty to the party claiming an interest in the accounts or chattel
paper.4 3 Similarly, transactions cast as leases may be subject to Arti-
cle 9 if they are functionally the grant of a security interest.44 If the
"lessor" is in doubt it can perfect, with no implication that the transac-
tion is not a true lease.45 Article 9 likewise covers consignment
sales.46
Since the requirements and costs of perfection are minimal, po-
tential problems are easily resolved. Litigation tends to arise from a
noncompliance that had no legal, economic, or practical justification.
41. A pledge is effective to prevent fraud since the pledgee has possession of the collat-
eral and, assuming the collateral value exceeds the debt, the pledgee need not concern
itself with the character of the pledgor, beyond confirming the pledgor's title.
42. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1990).
43. The absence of such certainty with respect to general intangibles has led the PEB
Study Group to recommend inclusion of the sale of general intangibles within the scope of
Article 9. Study Group Report, supra note 2, at 43.
44. Id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2).
45. Id. § 9-408.
46. Id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-114.
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From a business perspective, it is often more important that a rule
be certain, than "equitable." Often, the mere fact of certainty makes
the rule equitable. Transactions can be structured to accommodate
known rules, and priced to reflect costs imposed by the rules.
Article 9 takes full advantage of this principle. Under its regime,
millions of transactions have taken place without contest or cost. The
price of certainty is an occasional harsh result. This price is well worth
paying since it can be recognized, quantified, and, in most situations,
avoided, while the costs of uncertainty are immeasurable and insolu-
ble-except by not doing the deal.
VII. REMEDIES ARE DESIGNED TO MAXIMIZE ECONOMIC VALUES
Article 9 default rules may be phrased in subjective terms. For
example, the disposition of collateral "must be commercially reason-
able."47 The Article neither defines "commercially reasonable" nor
does it spell out the criteria of reasonableness. However, the uncer-
tainty that this would seem to engender does not exist in practice.
A secured party can avoid attack by behaving in a way that is
unarguably reasonable. In a given fact situation, the proper course of
action is not hard to identify. The creditor only runs into problems if
it is seeking to cut as close to the line of reasonableness as possible,
and there is rarely a legitimate commercial purpose to do so. To the
contrary, compliance generally involves no incremental cost because
the creditor's own interest is to realize the best possible recovery.
Even when some incremental compliance cost is entailed, the cost is
almost always immaterial in relation to avoiding litigation, preserving
deficiency claims against the debtor and third parties, and satisfying
the societal value of protecting the debtor's legitimate interest in the
collateral. Since the creditor's conduct is tested by the objective facts
of its procedural compliance,' and the creditor can make a record of
its conduct, avoidance of litigation, much less loss, is almost always
achievable.
A commercial debtor who has an equity in the collateral gener-
ally arranges for its disposition, repaying its creditor and retaining the
surplus. Creditors typically cooperate with such debtors, since the
creditor has no reason to expose itself to costs and litigation risks that
can be avoided by economic means. Therefore, if it is the creditor
47. Id § 9-504(3).
48. See id § 9-507(2).
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who is liquidating the collateral, that almost always means the creditor
is facing a deficiency.
Recognizing that creditors and debtors share an economic inter-
est in maximizing collateral values, Article 9's disposition rules are
designed to facilitate maximum recovery. For example, the Article
permits private sale by the creditor because such a sale often results in
higher collateral realization than would public sale.4 9 Similarly, reten-
tion of collateral by the creditor is permitted since "[e]xperience has
shown that the parties are frequently better off without a resale of the
collateral.
'50
The Article protects debtors by application of commercial rea-
sonableness standards, and it does not allow disclaimer of the UCC's
overriding obligations of "good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care."' Also, commercial debtors are capable of protecting their in-
terests, most often knowing more about the collateral and its potential
for disposition than do its creditors. Therefore, Article 9 looks to
prior notice of disposition5 2 as the means for debtors to protect
themselves.
VIII. ARTICLE 9 STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
CREDITOR AND DEBTOR
By its terms, Article 9 appears skewed towards the protection of
creditor rights and remedies. A balance between debtor and creditor
interests cannot be found within the four comers of the Article. How-
ever, I believe the Article does strike a fair balance. This balance
comes from the fact that the Article is not just an autonomous set of
rules. Its impact upon the parties must be measured in a total transac-
tional context.
Article 9 is only one element in the transactional balance. When
the credit extension closes, the debtor is funded. Typically, the funds
are immediately disbursed by the debtor, or applied for the debtor's
account, for such purposes as paying outstanding debt or acquiring
assets. The funds having been spent, if default occurred the next day,
the debtor would rarely be able to repay the accelerated debt. This is
not always the case, but most often it is.
On default, the creditor has recourse to the collateral. The
debtor, however, usually has dominion over the collateral. Rarely are
49. Id. § 9-504 cmt. 1.
50. Id. § 9-505(2) cmt. 1.
51. Id. § 1-102(3).
52. Id. § 9-504(3).
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the creditor's rights self-executing. Debtors can, and often do, ob-
struct and delay enforcement. When the creditor gets judicial relief, if
not sooner, the debtor can, and often does, go into bankruptcy. At
that point the automatic stay,5 3 cash collateral,5 4 and similar provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code usually preclude effective creditor ac-
tion. The debtor has use of the collateral, and the creditor faces a new
round of negotiations and proceedings. The law provides no fully ef-
fective recourse for the loss of collateral values and the expenses-
including money cost-the creditor may suffer.
The typical loan and security agreement includes a litany of
debtor representations, warranties, and covenants. For example, the
debtor represents that its inventory is marketable, that its receivables
are collectable, that its equipment is operable, and that these condi-
tions will continue to exist. It covenants that it will maintain, safe-
guard, and insure collateral; it will comply with all laws, including
health and safety standards that apply to the collateral; it will maintain
its financial and business condition; and so on. The creditor is rarely
able to ascertain the continuing truth of all these assurances. More-
over, circumstances may lead to the statements being, or becoming,
false through no fault of the debtor. Equipment may become techno-
logically obsolete, inventory may become unmarketable, account
debtors may become unable to pay receivables, and so on. While the
debtor's breach constitutes an event of default, all that such event
means is that the creditor can start enforcement proceedings. Insofar
as the harm has been done, for example, the collateral has not been
maintained, the inventory does not conform to safety standards, the
receivables are not collectable, the creditor has no effective remedy.
Viewed as a whole, the transaction results in the debtor having
the money and the collateral, while the creditor has a set of contrac-
tual and statutory rights that are not self-executing and are subject to
an array of practical and statutory constraints. The creditor has no
inherent reason to abuse its powers. Its only goal is to be repaid, and
it cannot realize any greater profit or gain by being heavy handed. To
the contrary, such behavior results in increased transactional costs,
diminution in collateral value, loss of market reputation, and possible
lender liability claims. In contrast, because the debtor wants funding,
and wants to retain the funding, it has a rational incentive to misrepre-
sent, breach, and, in the worst case, defraud. If a creditor misbehaves,
it is usually financially capable of responding to its debtor's damage
53. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
54. Id. § 363(c)(2).
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claim. The converse is rarely true if the creditor is the claimant
against the debtor.
One reason Article 9 works is that it takes into account the over-
all position of the parties. It recognizes that debtors have "leverage"
based on legal rights and economic positions that exist outside of the
Article's confines. The balance Article 9 strikes between debtor and
creditor reflects their overall positions.
IX. CONCLUSION
Article 9 does not work perfectly. Compliance with its perfection
rules is unduly complicated, and the adverse consequences of error
are often disproportionate to any harm in fact done.55 Difficulties
arise where Article 9 intersects with other bodies of law. For example,
security interests in fixtures are unavoidably subject to real estate law,
as well as to Article 9. States have lien laws that favor particular
classes of debtors, such as farmers, mechanics, materialmen, and
processors, and those laws are not necessarily integrated with Article
9. These "secret liens" are a potential trap for even well-informed,
diligent creditors. Federal law preempts Article 9 with respect to cer-
tain collateral, including vessels, aircraft, patents, or certain classes of
debtors, such as farmers.5 6 Although the Bankruptcy Code was inte-
grated with Article 9 when it was enacted in 1978, and Article 9 was
drafted with bankruptcy principles well in mind, the fit is not perfect.
Moreover, it is not practical to amend the state-enacted UCC to re-
spond to the all too frequent Bankruptcy Code amendments.
5 7
In addition, there are internal weaknesses to be corrected, 8 judi-
cial misconstructions to be cured, newly arisen needs to be met,59 and
inconsistent non-Article 9 laws to be reconciled. The revisers of Arti-
cle 9 are addressing this task and, insofar as extrinsic law permits, it
can in large measure be accomplished.
55. One purpose for revising Article 9 is to cure at least some of the perfection
difficulties.
56. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1988); Perisha-
ble Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. § 499(e)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
57. Aside from perfection infirmities, the major weaknesses of Article 9 largely derive
from state or federal law extrinsic to the Article.
58. See C. Edward Dobbs, Enforcement of Article 9 Security Interests-Why So Much
Deference to the Junior Secured Party, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 131 (1994) for a discussion of
the imperfect statutory balance between senior and junior security interests.
59. See Edwin E. Smith, Article 9 in Revision: A Proposal for Permitting Security Inter-
ests In Nonassignable Contracts and Permits, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 337 (1994) for a discus-
sion of Article 9's failure to effectively facilitate security interests in certain nonassignable
intangible assets.
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A successful revision can only be one which enhances the effec-
tiveness of Article 9 in meeting the needs of the affected persons. If
the goal is internal elegance, this success will not be realized. Article 9
is not a work of art, a painting whose beauty is to be found solely
within its frame. To the contrary, Article 9 is one component of a far
larger commercial "organism"-that is, the entire national personal
property financing market-of which it is itself a vital part. Like my
liver, it must be judged by how well it works, not how beautiful it
looks.
In this article, I have identified operational qualities that enable
Article 9 to accomplish its task. These qualities derive from the syn-
thesis of the Article with commercial dynamics. Article 9 is, in fact,
elegant, but the elegance is in this synthesis; its genius is found in its
transactional logic. As the Article 9 revision process moves forward,
the drafting committee will do well to preserve that synthesis and
logic.
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